Public support for the economic governance of the euro zone: empirical evidence from the debt crisis by Jacquier, Kristel
Public support for the economic governance of the euro
zone: empirical evidence from the debt crisis
Kristel Jacquier
To cite this version:
Kristel Jacquier. Public support for the economic governance of the euro zone: empirical
evidence from the debt crisis. Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
2015.63 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2015. <halshs-01222511>
HAL Id: halshs-01222511
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01222511
Submitted on 30 Oct 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public support for the economic governance of the euro 
zone: empirical evidence from the debt crisis 
 
Kristel JACQUIER 
 
2015.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
1 
 
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO 
ZONE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE DEBT CRISIS 
 
 
Kristel JACQUIER1 
September, 2015 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  
Using a unique database combining Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2014 trust is used as a proxy 
for the value people give to the EU response to the crisis. The focus is on the euro zone and the 
sovereign debt crisis which started in November 2009. Our empirical analysis supports the theory that 
citizens blame the EU for the poor macroeconomic performances in the euro area. We rely on a 
bivariate probit model to document the relationship between national government trust and EU trust. 
We find that domestic macroeconomic conditions influence both level of government. However, a 
deeper analysis suggests that the proximity with the average Euro zone economic performances 
increases trust in the European Union.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Trust in the European Union has significantly declined during the Great Recession. This leads one to 
believe that citizens consider the European Union as a relevant level of governance when crisis occurs. 
As previously mentioned in the literature (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014), since citizens do not identify a 
'European government', when they blame the EU for poor performance, they might lose trust in the EU 
as a whole. Therefore, trust is used as a proxy for the value people give to the EU response to the crisis. 
The focus is on the euro zone and the sovereign debt crisis which started in November 2009. Trust has 
been declining during the great recession but in the euro zone, trust in the EU started to drop in 2010 
while trust in the government had already began falling one year before. In the following paper we 
shall use the hypothesis that trust in the EU was influenced by the economic governance during the 
crisis. Indeed European institutions and a "European government" were on the spotlight and for the 
first time made decisions with critical consequences in domestic policies.  
The empirical evidence provided in the paper suggests that citizens blame European institutions for 
the poor macroeconomic performances in the area. Unemployment has a strong and robust negative 
influence on trust in the EU while long term interest rates are more volatile. As a second step we intend 
to prove that a considerable proportion of EU citizens are now able to make an informed opinion on 
EU politics and EU trust is not a proxy for evaluations of national politics and policy. Bivariate probit 
estimates show that macroeconomic conditions might have a different impact on trust in the European 
Union compared to trust in national governments. Predictive margins derived from the bivariate probit 
model suggest that citizens living in countries with economic performances close to the Euro zone 
average are more likely to trust the European Union.  
 
 
LITERATURE 
 
We build on a large body of work that has studied public support for the EU. At the micro level, EU 
support has been constantly related to favorable position in the labour market and more generally in 
the society. Studies focusing on people’s position in the labour market to explain support for the EU 
find a strong and robust effect (Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998) which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that gains and losses from the EU are unevenly distributed. Inglehart & Rabier (1978) are 
the first authors who introduced macroeconomic variables as determinants of public support for 
European integration. They showed that growth and inflation matter but long-term influences such as 
the length of membership or the cognitive mobilization are stronger predictors of attitudes towards 
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the EU. The link between citizens’ support towards the EU and economic conditions has been further 
developed in the 1990’s. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) confirm the impact of growth and inflation 
but unemployment had the strongest impact on the period considered (1973-93). Eichenberg and 
Dalton (1993) find a significant impact of inflation and intra-EC trade. Anderson and Reichert (1995) 
evaluate direct (EU budget) and indirect (from trade) benefits at the country and individual levels. They 
find EU budget is the strongest determinant of EU support for the 12 countries included in the study. 
During that period scholars agreed that macroeconomic conditions had an influence although its 
significance and magnitude would markedly vary depending on the sample and the time-period 
considered. Since the early 1990s and especially after the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, the 
literature has shown that macroeconomic conditions have become less significant (Eichenberg and 
Dalton, 2007). In fact, it is argued that once the benefits of greater intra-European trade flows and 
more stable prices are regarded as acquired, European citizens have started considering the 
redistributive implications of the convergence criteria on national policies, particularly on the different 
national welfare state models.  
In the context of the current sovereign debt crisis, several scholars advance the hypothesis that 
macroeconomic variables could regain influence on citizens’ evaluation. Not only has the EU acquired 
more competencies over years and citizens may hold it accountable for economic outcomes (Hobolt & 
Tilley 2014) but the context of the crisis gives an opportunity for citizens to evaluate the European 
governance based on decisions with a domestic impact. Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) support the idea 
that citizens consider the EU as a relevant actor to tackle the sovereign debt crisis. The European Union 
is no longer evaluated through the benefits of membership but rather on the implications of the 
economic governance. During the crisis, institutions in the Euro area (mainly the European Council) 
have had to take measures that might disadvantage the typical ‘winners of European integration’ in 
certain countries (Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014). Gomez (2014) uses the Eurobarometer database from 
September 2007 to May 2011 and brings evidence that European citizens blame the EU for the bad 
economic situation in their home country. They find robust results for unemployment and interest 
rates suggesting that there might be a feeling that the EU has failed to solve the sovereign debt crisis. 
Gomez (2014) further analyses the preferences of younger Europeans (aged 30 or less in the study) 
and finds that the effects of economic growth and interest rates are significantly stronger for this 
segment of the population. Roth et al. (2014) seek to measure the impact unemployment on trust in 
the European Central Bank. They use fixed effects Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) on panel 
date over the period 1999-2012. To do so, they calculate "net trust" by subtracting the percentage of 
those who trust from those who do not trust. They separate pre-crisis from post-crisis periods and also 
differentiate between core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). They find a robust 
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negative relationship between unemployment and trust in the European Central Bank in times of crisis 
especially in periphery countries. Serricchio et al. (2013) study the effect of growth, inflation and 
unemployment on Euroscepticism using a logistic regression model. They compare data from 2007 
and 2010 in order to capture the impact of the current financial crisis. They find a negative impact of 
GDP growth in 2007 that becomes insignificant in 2010. Inflation and unemployment have no impact 
in their model. Armingeon and Ceka (2014) use 5 waves of Eurobarometer surveys over the period 
2007-2011. They estimate a multilevel logistic regression including 27 EU countries. Their analysis is 
framed in David Easton theory of institutional support. Affective (diffuse) support and utilitarian 
(specific) support determine the overall preferences of citizens towards institutions. Diffuse support is 
based on ideology and cultural attachment. Diffuse support is by definition less volatile than specific 
support that might fluctuate with potential gains and losses that a voter perceives from a given policy 
outcome. Armingeon and Ceka (2014) hypothesize that the great recession has affected both diffuse 
and specific support for the European Union. To explain both forms of support they draw on cue 
theory (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Cue theory states that cognitive short-cuts, contextual factors and 
elite cues help citizens form opinions about issues they have little knowledge about. Armingeon and 
Ceka (2014) argue that citizens tend to use national context to evaluate the EU and it should be even 
more the case during the great recession because when discontent is high it extends to any level of 
government. On the other hand if economic and social conditions are good there are no reason to 
distrust any government. Trust in national government and trust in the EU are correlated by 0.67 in 
their sample
2
 and the regression analysis enhances that trust in the government is the strongest 
determinant of EU trust. None of the macro-economic indicators included in the analysis are 
significant suggesting that they do not affect trust in the period studied. Armingeon and Ceka (2014) 
elaborate on a causal relationship between trust in national governments and trust in the EU showing 
that national elections and domestic economic conditions affect trust in the European Union.  
Anderson (1998) is one of the first papers dealing with the interplay between national and European 
politics. The empirical study in the paper tends to prove that trust in the EU is a proxy for trust in 
national governments. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) and Munoz et al (2011) also show that national 
institutions influence preference towards the European Union. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) highlight that 
distrust in national institutions have a positive influence on support for the European Union. Citizens in 
countries where corruption is high are more inclined to transfer sovereignty to European institutions. 
Munoz et al (2011) confirm that living in a country with low trust institutions increases trust in the 
European Union. All these empirical contributions may as well support the idea that trust in the EU and 
trust in national governments are influenced by the same factors but do not necessarily influence one 
                                                          
2
 In our sample the correlation coefficient is r=0.457 
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another. It would be wishful thinking to imagine that trust in different level of institutions could be 
perfectly independent. In the context of European integration, where decision-making is heavily 
intergovernmental it is even more unlikely for citizens to compartmentalize both level of governments. 
The present paper provides empirical evidence describing the interplay between national and 
European politics, especially how macroeconomic variables influence institutional trust at the national 
and European level.     
 
The literature so far has showed that macroeconomic variables are unstable predictors of EU support. 
Furthermore, documenting the interaction between national and European levels of governance is 
promising.   
 
 
THE DATA 
 
We use a unique database combining Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2014 and macroeconomic 
variables
3
. The micro variables are demographic controls for age and gender as well as indicators for 
occupation and education level. As for macro variable we consider 2 adverse macroeconomic shocks: 
Unemployment and long-term interest rates. The macro variables are standardized (variable with mean 
0 and standard deviation 1).  
The analysis covers a 10-year period and includes notably returning confidence after 2012. The EU is 
not binding in terms of macroeconomic policies, while the single currency is. In order to assess the role 
of market pressure as well as growth and employment perspectives we limited the sample to the 15 EU 
member states that had adopted the Euro when the crisis occurred: Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus and 
Malta
4
. 
 
Most empirical analyses use the membership question from the Eurobarometer to evaluate public 
support for the European Union (Gabel, 2009; Kuhn et al, 2014). The question is as follows:  
 "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the European Community 
 (Common Market) is a bad thing (1), neither good nor bad (2), or a good thing (3)?" 
 
                                                          
3
 A detailed description is provided in the appendix 
4
 11 countries participated in the official launch of the euro on 1 January 1999 (Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal); Greece adopted the single currency in 
2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008.  
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This question offers a subjective evaluation of the overall benefits of the European Union which is an 
essential dimension of support for the EU, and it is of course highly correlated to institutional trust. 
Nevertheless, by using the "trust" question we aim to target another dimension of support for the EU: 
the evaluation of the governance of the euro zone. Although it is clear that all the dimensions are 
jumbled together when individuals respond to surveys, the governance of the euro zone is likely to 
have affected institutional trust the most.  
 
 
Our dependent variable is “Trust in the European Union”. Citizens were asked the following question:  
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it”.  
 
Respondents are presented with several institutions, one of which being the European Union. Along 
with “tend to trust” and “tend not to trust”, respondents can also use a third category of answer “don’t 
know”. As can be seen in the appendix, the amount of don’t know answers are negligible, they are thus 
treated as missing values when logistic regressions are computed.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
The empirical analysis seeks to explain trust in the European Union. The dependent variable 
encompasses two choices: tend to trust and tend not to trust. Thus a logistic regression is estimated. It 
can be expressed as:  
 
                                            
With               , the cumulative logistic distribution function. The parameter vector , is 
estimated by maximum likelihood.  
 
Logistic models are latent variable models,      , the latent variable is defined as follow: 
      
            
            
   
 
The baseline model includes the main socioeconomic characteristics and the essential controls: 
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Where i characterizes individuals and j represents countries. D is a vector of individual socio-
demographic characteristics (age and gender). O represents the occupation of individuals. S is a 
continuous variable capturing a trend in surveys over time. C stands for country dummies which 
accounts for any omitted country-specific influence and     is the error term. Country dummies control 
for omitted variables and measurements errors. Therefore within country variation is exploited.  
 
Secondly macroeconomic variables are included one by one and altogether: 
                                       
 
Following Armingeon and Ceka (2014) we want to see if being under IMF conditionality affected EU 
trust.  A dummy variable for the intervention of the “Troika”
5
 is included. It takes the value 1 for Greece 
in 2010, for Ireland and Portugal in 2011 and for Cyprus in 2012. 
 
In the next step three sub-samples are created in order to disentangle the consequences of the crisis. 
We identify the announcement by Papandreou's government in early November 2009 as the start of 
the public debt crisis in Europe
6
. Consequently, the pre-crisis sample includes surveys from 2004 to 
2009, the post crisis from 2010 to 2014, and the peak of the crisis pool surveys from 2010 to 2012. 
 
In the second part of the analysis trust in the European Union and trust in national governments are 
jointly considered. We make the assumption that there are unobserved variables that influence people 
to both trust (or distrust) the EU and their government. Both opinions are determined by the same 
variables so that the error terms of the equations below are correlated. Like the seemingly unrelated 
regression model, bivariate probit models assume that the i.i.d. errors are correlated. 
 
 
                                       
                                      
  
 
  and   are vectors of unknown parameters. The subscript   denotes an individual observation.      
and     are the error terms. They are assumed to be normally distributed      
          . 
                                                          
5
 The alliance between the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary 
Fund to monitor the bailout plans in the Euro zone during the debt crisis 
6
 previous data on government debt levels and deficits had been misreported : in November 2009 Greece runs a 
year deficit of 12.7% of GDP, and a public debt of $410 billion 
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We write                          
If    , the error terms are uncorrelated and both equations can be estimated separately.  
If    , separated estimates would be biased.  
See the appendix for details on likelihood functions.  
 
In order to document the interplay between trust and macroeconomic variables we use predictive 
margins. Predictive margins are conditional expectations of responses. They display the averages of 
predictions over the estimation sample for fixed values of one covariate.  
In figures 10 to 15 the focus is on 4 combinations of responses:   
- Trust in the EU=0 Trust in national government=0 
- Trust in the EU=1 Trust in national government=1 
- Trust in the EU=0 Trust in national government=1 
- Trust in the EU=1 Trust in national government=0 
We estimate the probability of one of these combinations to occur, for a given level of unemployment 
rate (fixed values) and integrating over the remaining covariate (average marginal effect).  
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Adverse shocks 
Figure 1: Unemployment from 2004 to 2014 
 
 
Figure 1 shows a surge in unemployment and a diverging trend between member states. Such raise in 
unemployment on one side, and the involvement of the European Union in the crisis on the other side 
is likely to create mixed opinions among European citizens.  
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Figure 2: Long term interest rates in Central Europe 
 
Figure 3: Long term interest rates in periphery Europe 
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Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of long-term interest rates for central Europe. One can see a 
downward trend and more dispersion at the end of the period. Peripheral countries (figure 3) 
conversely, display an upward trend with an even greater dispersion in 2014.  
 
The consequences of the crisis are well-known: low growth or recession, rising unemployment, 
growing deficits and public debts. Figures 1 to 3 highlight its asymmetric economic consequences 
among the member states. The diverging trend clearly appears from 2010 onwards between the center 
and the periphery of the European Union, but also within the sub-groups.  
 
 
Trust 
 
Figure 4: trust in the European Union from 2004 to 2014
7
 
 
 
The loss of trust does not seem to reflect the immediate impact of the crisis. The peak of the crisis is 
around October-November 2008, corresponding to the 70.1 EB survey. However the confidence level 
in this survey remains high. The share of citizens who tend not to trust the EU starts to increase in May 
2010 which corresponds to the onset of the Greek government-debt crisis. Indeed, the announcement 
                                                          
7
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was made in early November 2009, the data collection of EB 72.4 took place in October 2009, so the 
first survey included in our dataset that take into account the debt crisis is EB 73.4 in May 2010. The 
curves of trust and distrust reversed in late 2010. For the first time since the start of the EMU, more 
citizens distrust the European Union than trust it. Trust starts to roll upward in 2013 with a clear 
increase in 2014. The evolution of the curves suggests that they might reverse again in the next few 
years. Additionally, figure 4 shows that indifference towards the EU tends to decline in the euro zone. 
 
Figure 5: Trust in the EU and trust in national governments  
 
 
In figure 5, trust in the government is compared to trust in the EU over the period 2004-2014. Both 
institutions have suffered from the crisis. Strikingly, before 2008 the curves seem symmetric with a 
clearly higher level of trust in the European Union. From 2008 the curves show different tendencies. 
Trust in national governments started to decrease in 2009 while trust in the EU remains constant at 
that time (which is apparent in figure 4 also). Trust in the EU drops constantly from 2010 to 2012 while 
the path of government trust is more erratic. Overall trust in the EU has reduced a lot more, as a result 
in 2014 trust in the two institutions end up at comparable levels in 2013. In what we can call the post-
crisis period, trust in the EU seems to recover better. Descriptive statistics in the appendix reveal that 
27% of the sample has responded differently for trust in the EU and trust in national government. We 
hypothesize that many citizens are now able to make an informed opinion on EU politics.  
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The impact of macro variables on trust   
 
Figure 6: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and unemployment by countries in 2004 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and unemployment by countries in 2014 
 
AT
BE
CY
DE
ES
FI
FR
GR
IE
IT
LU
NL
PT
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
E
U
 t
ru
s
t
4 6 8 10 12
unemployment rate
AT
BE
CY
DE
ES
FI
FR
GR
IE
IT
LU
MT
NL
PT
SI
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
In
d
e
x
 o
f 
s
u
p
p
o
rt
 f
o
r 
th
e
 E
U
5 10 15 20 25
Unemployment rate
Fitted values trustEU3
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.63
14 
 
Figure 8: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and interest rates by countries in 2004 
 
 
Figure 9: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and interest rates by countries in 2014 
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Figure 6 and 7 give an idea of the relationship that might exist between trust and unemployment. In 
2004 (figure 6) the relationship seems inexistent. In 2014 however (figure 7), a trend has appeared, 
although it is mainly driven by outermost countries. We observe the same phenomenon for interest 
rates (figure 8 and 9). Overall, figure 6 to 9 suggest that macroeconomic variables are correlated to 
trust in the European Union after the debt crisis.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The tables display odd ratios to facilitate the interpretation. Odd ratios are exponentiated coefficient. 
Let   be the unexponentiated coefficient,   its standard error, and    and    the reported confidence 
interval for  . In exponentiated form, the point estimate is   , the standard error   s, and the 
confidence interval     and    . P-values are the same as those for  , as are Z and t statistics. 
We use standardized values of unemployment rates and long term interest rates to ease the 
interpretation of the results. Variables have been rescaled to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one
8
. Each case's value on the standardized variable indicates its difference from the mean 
of the original variable in number of standard deviations (of the original variable). For example, 2 
indicates that a case has a value two standard deviations higher than the mean.  
 
The baseline model is presented in Model 1 and replicates the previous findings in the literature (see 
Gomez, 2014). Managers and students are the most pro-EU social classes while manual workers an 
unemployed people trust European integration the least. As compared to white collars, unemployed 
people trust the European Union 43% less. In model 2 the dummy "Troika" is highly significant and 
reports that those direct interventions in domestic politics decrease trust by 20%. Model 3 and 4 add 
macro variables one by one. The unemployment rate has the strongest impact (trust decreases by 35% 
as unemployment increases by one standard deviation) and one standard deviation increase in interest 
rates reduce trust by 18%. Model 5 includes the macro variables altogether. Their significance remains 
high but the impact of long term interest rates on trust is weaker (a reduction of only 4%). The pseudo 
R-squared is 0,056 for both models 3 and 5 which imply that long term interest rates do not improve 
the explanatory power of the model.  
                                                          
8
 the mean (of the original variable) is subtracted from the value for each case, and the difference between the 
individual's score and the mean is divided by the standard deviation (of the original variable). By definition 
(because the sample includes only Euro zone countries), the mean of the unemployment rate variable is the 
average Euro zone unemployment rate over the 10 years considered.  
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ref cat: male
female 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.940*** 0.941*** 0.940***
(-6.66) (-6.68) (-6.97) (-6.84) (-6.99)   
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 1.199*** 1.200*** 1.197*** 1.202*** 1.197***
(9.19) (9.20) (9.01) (9.27) (9.03)   
40-54 0.881*** 0.880*** 0.884*** 0.882*** 0.884***
(-10.62) (-10.68) (-10.28) (-10.53) (-10.28)   
Above 55 0.969* 0.967* 0.955** 0.961** 0.955** 
(-2.23) (-2.33) (-3.17) (-2.75) (-3.21)   
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 1.036 1.037 1.044* 1.038 1.044*  
(1.83) (1.86) (2.17) (1.88) (2.16)   
Manager 1.351*** 1.350*** 1.355*** 1.345*** 1.354***
(16.10) (16.05) (16.19) (15.83) (16.14)   
Manual worker 0.775*** 0.774*** 0.774*** 0.773*** 0.774***
(-16.05) (-16.09) (-15.98) (-16.15) (-16.00)   
House person 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.804*** 0.808*** 0.804***
(-10.68) (-10.66) (-11.00) (-10.82) (-11.01)   
Unemployed 0.577*** 0.577*** 0.619*** 0.586*** 0.618***
(-27.41) (-27.39) (-23.64) (-26.50) (-23.68)   
Retired 0.869*** 0.869*** 0.880*** 0.872*** 0.880***
(-7.68) (-7.67) (-6.94) (-7.50) (-6.95)   
Student 1.376*** 1.375*** 1.395*** 1.370*** 1.392***
(12.72) (12.67) (13.14) (12.49) (13.07)   
survey 0.994*** 0.994*** 0.996*** 0.994*** 0.996***
(-85.75) (-84.99) (-47.78) (-86.96) (-46.95)   
Troika 0.798***                
(-8.25)                
Unemployment rate 0.649*** 0.665***
(-56.48) (-45.83)   
Long term interest rates 0.823*** 0.966***
(-32.96) (-5.23)   
Country fixed effects
Observations 243456 243456 243456 243456 243456
pseudo R-sq 0.046 0.046 0.056 0.049 0.056   
Log likelihood -161036.3 -161002.0 -159349.7 -160443.0 -159335.9   
chi2 15354.3 15423.0 18727.5 16541.0 18755.1   
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Model 6 to 11 run estimates on three sub-samples: The pre-crisis (2004-2009), the post crisis (2010-
2014) and the peak of the crisis (2010-2012). The most striking result is that macroeconomic variables 
explain public trust the best after the crisis (R2 goes from 0.038 to 0.042). Unemployment has a greater 
impact on trust during the peak of the crisis but the impact remains strong and highly significant in 
each of the subsample. The role played by long term interest rates is more ambiguous. Before the 
crisis long term interest rates had a positive impact on trust in the EU. The impact remains positive at 
the heart of the crisis and reversed in the post crisis period. One line of explanation would be that 
before the crisis, high interest rates countries are those who benefited from the adoption of the single 
currency the most (notably through access to credit). During the crisis, they have requested solidarity 
from other member states through bailouts of great amount. However from 2010 there is a strong 
diverging trend in long term interest rates (as shown in figure 2 and 3) which has exacerbated the lack 
of solidarity between member states within the euro zone and might have reduced trust in the EU from 
citizens in countries with high interest rates.  
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Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
ref cat: male
female 0.952*** 0.951*** 0.930*** 0.929*** 0.921*** 0.921***
(-3.74) (-3.81) (-6.00) (-6.09)   (-5.27) (-5.28)   
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 1.169*** 1.166*** 1.211*** 1.216*** 1.185*** 1.186***
(5.41) (5.32) (6.91) (7.04)   (4.87) (4.89)   
40-54 0.875*** 0.874*** 0.886*** 0.889*** 0.920*** 0.923***
(-7.66) (-7.77) (-7.21) (-6.99)   (-3.91) (-3.76)   
Above 55 0.969 0.964 0.942** 0.943** 0.973 0.973   
(-1.50) (-1.72) (-3.02) (-2.95)   (-1.09) (-1.06)   
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 1.018 1.020 1.067* 1.063*  1.045 1.044   
(0.60) (0.67) (2.40) (2.27)   (1.28) (1.25)   
Manager 1.321*** 1.326*** 1.388*** 1.388*** 1.370*** 1.373***
(10.13) (10.25) (12.72) (12.70)   (9.48) (9.56)   
Manual worker 0.776*** 0.776*** 0.762*** 0.764*** 0.760*** 0.762***
(-10.98) (-10.97) (-12.17) (-12.02)   (-9.70) (-9.59)   
House person 0.829*** 0.829*** 0.772*** 0.776*** 0.775*** 0.776***
(-6.75) (-6.75) (-9.02) (-8.83)   (-7.06) (-7.01)   
Unemployed 0.601*** 0.614*** 0.608*** 0.619*** 0.612*** 0.621***
(-16.22) (-15.50) (-18.55) (-17.82)   (-14.16) (-13.74)   
Retired 0.860*** 0.864*** 0.888*** 0.892*** 0.887*** 0.892***
(-5.52) (-5.38) (-4.74) (-4.56)   (-3.72) (-3.53)   
Student 1.459*** 1.467*** 1.353*** 1.356*** 1.377*** 1.384***
(10.11) (10.25) (8.73) (8.77)   (7.28) (7.38)   
survey 1.000 1.000 0.994*** 0.996*** 0.986*** 0.989***
(1.19) (-1.32) (-30.48) (-16.31)   (-30.39) (-20.90)   
Long term interest rates 1.321*** 0.951*** 1.066** 
(6.54) (-5.26)   (3.14)   
Unemployment 0.777*** 0.681*** 0.624***
(-12.06) (-21.72)   (-10.18)   
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 113416 113416 130040 130040 77743 77743
pseudo R-sq 0.027 0.028 0.038 0.042   0.036 0.038   
Log likelihood -74634.3 -74540.7 -84365.7 -84035.1   -51221.4 -51129.4   
chi2 4136.3 4323.6 6694.3 7355.6   3831.5 4015.4   
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Pre crisis Post crisis 2010-2012
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The second part of the analysis relies on biprobit estimates and focus on the post-crisis period
9
. Model 
12 is the baseline model, including the microeconomic determinants and country dummies. The 
regression indicates that the errors term are indeed correlated and estimating trust in the European 
Union and trust in national government jointly is relevant. Socioeconomic determinants included in the 
model such as age and occupation, but also some variables that could not be included, influence both 
opinions. Long-term interest rates are included in models 13 to 15 and bring interesting results. Except 
in model 14 (where Euro zone unemployment rates are included) the impact of interest rates on trust 
changes sign. It even becomes insignificant for trust in national governments in model 15. In the end, 
interest rates have robust negative impact on trust in the European Union while the impact on national 
government trust is volatile. Monitored interest rates are an essential requirement for member states 
to adopt the single currency
10
. The European Commission disapproves of high interest rates which 
might explain that interest rates reduce trust in the European Union in each model. Unemployment 
rates have a strong and robust negative impact on trust in institutions whether one considers national 
government or the EU, national unemployment rates and European unemployment rates. A variable 
measuring the gap between the unemployment level in the country the individual lives in and the 
mean level of unemployment in the euro area is included in model 15. The gap is positive when 
national unemployment is inferior to the Euro zone average; it is negative when national 
unemployment is superior to the Euro zone average. Not surprisingly, the gap in unemployment has a 
positive impact. Individuals in countries where unemployment is superior to the Euro zone average are 
less likely to trust both their government and the European Union.  
 
We want to emphasize the interplay between the national and European level and the fact that a 
significant part of citizens now have a documented opinion on European politics. As appears from the 
descriptive statistics, 27% of the sample expresses different opinions on trust in the EU and trust in 
national government and we want to know if macroeconomic variables play a role. Interpretation of 
regression tables can be very challenging in nonlinear models such as probit regression. Predictive 
margins allow interpreting effects on outcomes such as probabilities. Predictive margins are calculated 
from predictions of the model 13 for unemployment, model 14 for Euro zone unemployment, and 
model 15 the gap between national and euro zone average unemployment rates
11
.  
 
 
                                                          
9
 pooled estimates are available upon request 
10
 Convergence criteria state that long term interest rates shall not be no more than 2.0% higher, than the unweighted 
arithmetic average of the similar 10-year government bond yields in the 3 EU member states with the lowest HICP inflation 
11
 We stop using standardized values for macroeconomic variables.  
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Following Armingeon and Ceka (2014) we define four types of Europeans based on their level of 
institutional trust:  
- The trusting citizens: trust each level of government 
- The detached citizens distrust each level of government 
- The escapists: trust the European Union but not their government 
- The nationalists: trust only their government 
 
The last two categories are analyzed
12
. Figures 10 to 15 illustrate the results. Figure 10 and 11 consider 
unemployment in the country the respondent lives in. As can be seen in figure 11, when 
unemployment goes up, the combination of high trust in national government and low trust in the EU 
is unlikely to happen. The relationship is less linear for escapists. When unemployment is around the 
average euro zone, citizens are the most likely to trust the European Union more than their own 
government. The difference is not marked and the confidence intervals are bigger than for nationalist 
citizens but it provides insights on the interplay between the national context and trust in both level of 
government. The next figures (12 to 13) involve euro zone average unemployment. When European 
unemployment is high, nationalist preferences are more likely to emerge. And the opposite is true, 
which gives the idea that what determines trust in the European Union might be the gap between 
national economic performances and the situation in the whole Euro area. Indeed, if one's country is 
falling behind, it becomes less likely that European solidarity prevails. The last two figures (14 and 15) 
illustrate that view. National preferences are more likely to emerge when national unemployment is 
inferior to the European average (figure 15). Figure 14 displays the most interesting result: citizens 
living in countries with a close to European average unemployment rate are the most likely to trust the 
EU more than their own government (i.e. to fall into the category of escapist citizens). To summarize, 
citizens who support the European project are more likely to emerge in countries with close European 
average economic performances.   
  
                                                          
12
 Predictive margins for trusting and detached citizens are available upon request 
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* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Model 12 Model 13
Trust national TrustEU Trust national TrustEU
ref cat: male
female -0.053*** -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.048***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 0.057*** 0.113*** 0.059*** 0.116***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
40-54 -0.009 -0.074*** -0.006 -0.072***
(0.414) (0.000) (0.575) (0.000)
Above 55 0.087*** -0.034*** 0.089*** -0.034***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006)
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 0.006 0.040** 0.006 0.038**
(0.718) (0.018) (0.746) (0.023)
Manager 0.154*** 0.202*** 0.156*** 0.203***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manual worker -0.159*** -0.169*** -0.156*** -0.167***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House person -0.075*** -0.160*** -0.071*** -0.156***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.333*** -0.305*** -0.321*** -0.293***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Retired -0.025 -0.075*** -0.021 -0.071***
(0.132) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000)
Student 0.063*** 0.185*** 0.064*** 0.186***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
survey -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.119) (0.000)
Long term interest rates 0.005* -0.014***
(0.055) (0.000)
-0.057*** -0.047***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.276*** 2.929*** 0.142 2.260***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000)
0.862*** 0.858***
(0.000) (0.000)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 127570 127570 127570 127570
Estimated covariance of 
error terms
National unemployment 
rate
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* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Model 14 Model 15
Trust national TrustEU Trust national TrustEU
ref cat: male
female -0.053*** -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.047***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 0.057*** 0.116*** 0.058*** 0.114***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
40-54 -0.009 -0.076*** -0.006 -0.073***
(0.397) (0.000) (0.581) (0.000)
Above 55 0.086*** -0.037*** 0.089*** -0.034***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.006)
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 0.006 0.043** 0.005 0.038**
(0.724) (0.012) (0.786) (0.024)
Manager 0.154*** 0.202*** 0.156*** 0.202***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manual worker -0.159*** -0.167*** -0.157*** -0.168***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House person -0.074*** -0.157*** -0.072*** -0.157***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.331*** -0.301*** -0.322*** -0.295***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Retired -0.024 -0.074*** -0.020 -0.071***
(0.142) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000)
Student 0.062*** 0.184*** 0.065*** 0.185***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
survey -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Long term interest rates -0.013*** -0.021*** 0.004 -0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.156) (0.000)
-0.021** -0.170***
(0.013) (0.000)
0.058*** 0.036***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.239*** 0.872*** 1.025*** 3.102***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.864*** 0.860***
(0.000) (0.000)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 127570 127570 127570 127570
Estimated covariance of 
error terms
Euro zone unemployment 
rate
Distance from Eurozone 
mean unemployment
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Figure 10. Predictive margins: unemployment (escapist) 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Predictive margins: unemployment (nationalist) 
 
 
 
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
.1
8
P
r(
T
ru
s
tn
a
t=
0
,T
ru
s
te
u
=
1
)
3 4.5 6 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21 22.5 24
U
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
.1
2
P
r(
T
ru
s
tn
a
t=
1
,T
ru
s
te
u
=
0
)
3 4.5 6 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21 22.5 24
U
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.63
24 
 
Figure 12. Predictive margins: average euro zone unemployment (escapist) 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Predictive margins: average euro zone unemployment (nationalist) 
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Figure 14. Predictive margins: gap between national and euro zone average unemployment (escapist) 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Predictive margins: gap between national and euro zone average unemployment (nationalist) 
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
Alternative specifications are presented in the appendix to make sure the previous results are robust. 
First of all, we include survey dummies to control for any factors common to one survey that might 
bias the coefficients (for example, a major event related to the EU that might have taken place around 
the date of the interviews). Such model no longer exploits the variation over time, but only the 
variation of responses within the same survey. Column 1 is the baseline model, column 2 includes the 
macroeconomic variable and column 3 focuses on the post-crisis period (2010-2014). This specification 
indeed has an impact on the significance of the macroeconomic variables. Long term interest rates in 
the post-crisis period no longer impact on trust in the EU. Coefficients for unemployment rates remain 
unaltered. This is not surprising because in the previous sections coefficients for long term interest 
rates were quite volatile. Additionally fixed effects reduce the variation that can be exploited, 
consequently significance is harder to achieve.  
Subsequently, trust in national government is included as an explanatory variable. The inclusion of the 
variable does not challenge our results. However when the period considered is 2007-2011 as in 
Armingeon and Ceka (2014), the significance of the unemployment rate is highly reduced which might 
explain the fact that unemployment rate is not significant in their study. Indeed, when survey dummies 
are included (as in the case of their study), the coefficient for unemployment rate is no longer 
significant.   
Finally, ordinary least square regressions are estimated for the baseline model, and seemingly 
unrelated equations are carried out. The estimation procedure does not alter the sign and significance 
of all the previously mentioned results.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The empirical evidence provided in the paper suggests that the interconnection between the 
economies of the Euro zone became tangible. And as economic policies go beyond national 
institutions, citizens blame the EU institutions for the poor macroeconomic performances in the area. 
The first part of the empirical analysis enhances the ambiguous role played by long term interest rates, 
changing sign from one period to another. Before the crisis, high interest rates countries are those who 
benefited the most from the adoption of the single currency and during the crisis several countries 
with high interest rates have received bailouts. However they did not recover
13
 and as their economic 
performances move away from other countries in the EU, solidarity becomes less likely which might 
explain the interest rates are associated with lower trust in the post-crisis period. As a second step we 
document the idea that support for the EU is derived from evaluations of national politics and policy. 
We hypothesize that a considerable proportion of EU citizens are now able to make an informed 
opinion on EU politics. Bivariate probit estimates show that macroeconomic conditions might have a 
different impact on trust in the European Union compared to trust in national governments. Predictive 
margins derived from the bivariate probit model suggest that citizens living in countries with economic 
performances close to the Euro zone average are more likely to trust the European Union. This again 
underscores the political challenges an increasingly heterogeneous European Union poses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Except for Ireland 
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APPENDIX 
 
Macro variables, source EUROSTAT 
 
Long-term interest rates  
EMU convergence criterion bond yields (10yr government bonds)  
 
Unemployment rate 
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15-74 who were without work during the reference week, but 
who are currently available for work and were either actively seeking work in the past four weeks 
or had already found a job to start within the next three months. 
 
Micro variables, source Eurobarometer  
Eurobarometers (EB) Included in the Analysis:  
   Code    Date             
EB 62.0 
 
November 2004   EB 74.2 
 
Nov-Dec 2010 
EB 63.4 
 
May-June 2005 
 
EB 75.3  
 
May 2011 
 EB 66.1 
 
October 2006 
 
EB 76.3 
 
November 2011 
EB 67.2 
 
April-May 2007 
 
EB 77.3 
 
May 2012 
 EB 68.1  
 
Sept–Oct 2007 
 
EB 78.1 
 
November 2012 
EB 69.2 
 
March–May 2008 
 
EB 79.3 
 
2013 
 EB 70.1  
 
Oct–Nov 2008 
 
EB 80.1 
 
November 2013 
EB 71.3 
 
June–July 2009 
 
EB 81.2 
 
March 2014 
 EB 72.4 
 
Oct–Nov 2009 
 
EB 82.3 
 
November 2014 
EB 73.4  
 
May 2010 
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Likelihood functions  
 
The likelihood function for logit is: 
        
   
         
   
             
S stands for all the observations  , such that      and       
        . 
The likelihood-ratio chi2 test is defined as          where   is the log likelihood of the full model, 
and   the log likelihood of the model including only the constant term.  
The pseudo R-square (McFadden 1974) is defined as         
 
 
For bivariate probit regression, the log likelihood, is given by 
  
 
            
 
 
  
             
 
 
      
          
            
  
      
          
            
  
  
          
         
 
   
      
 
      
    
   
   is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution 
 
In the maximum likelihood estimation of bivariate probit models atanh   is estimated. From the 
likelihood function, if     then the log likelihood is equal to the sum of the log likelihood of the two 
univariate probit models. A likelihood-ratio test can thus be performed.  
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Summary statistics 
 
Frequency Percentage Total
Survey number
620 27,928 10.36 269465
661 14,107 5.24 269465
672 14,142 5.25 269465
681 14,183 5.26 269465
692 14,19 5.27 269465
701 14,173 5.26 269465
713 14,17 5.26 269465
724 14,192 5.27 269465
734 14,157 5.25 269465
742 14,259 5.29 269465
753 14,246 5.29 269465
763 14,176 5.26 269465
773 14,179 5.26 269465
781 14,19 5.27 269465
793 14,111 5.24 269465
801 14,346 5.32 269465
812 14,403 5.35 269465
823 14,313 5.31 269465
Occupation
Self employed 21587 8.01 269465
managers 25170 9.34 269465
other white collars28905 10.73 269465
manual workers 51970 19.29 269465
House person 27342 10.15 269465
Unemployed 21111 7.83 269465
Retired 72326 26.84 269465
Student 21054 7.81 269465
Age categories
15-24 30605 11.36 269465
25-39 62967 23.37 269465
40-54 70392 26.12 269465
Above 55 105501 39.15 269465
Gender
Male 123986 46.01 269465
Female 145479 53.99 269465
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Frequency Percentage Total
Trust in the EU
tend not to trust 123861 45.97 269465
tend to trust 119595 44.38 269465
don't know 26009 9.65 269465
Trust in the EU (binary)
Tend not to trust 123,861 50.88 243456
Tend to trust 119,595 49.12 243456
Trust in national government
Tend to trust 97,605 37.54 259983
Tend not to trust 157,777 60.69 259983
don't know 4,601 1.77 259983
Trust in national government (binary)
tend not to trust 167,259 63.15 264864
tend to trust 97,605 36.85 264864
Country
Austria 19143 7.10 269465
Belgium 19241 7.14 269465
Cyprus 9560 3.55 269465
Finland 19153 7.11 269465
France 19471 7.23 269465
Germany 29242 10.85 269465
Greece 19012 7.06 269465
Ireland 19077 7.08 269465
Italy 19441 7.21 269465
Luxembourg 9597 3.56 269465
Malta 9502 3.53 269465
Netherlands 19292 7.16 269465
Portugal 19120 7.10 269465
Slovenia 19439 7.21 269465
Spain 19175 7.12 269465
Year
2004 13773 5.23 269465
2005 14155 5.25 269465
2006 14107 5.23 269465
2007 28325 10.50 269465
2008 28363 10.51 269465
2009 28362 10.51 269465
2010 28416 10.53 269465
2011 28422 10.53 269465
2012 28369 10.51 269465
2013 28457 10.55 269465
2014 28716 10.64 269465
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Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
U 269465 9.105307 4.902011 3.7 27.5
Ustd 269465 1.89e-09 1 -1.102671 3.752479
LTr 269465 4.245855 2.502474 1.16 22.5
LTrstd 269465 2.27e-10 1 -1.233121 7.294439
U_EU 269465 9.105307 1.874386 6.592958 11.89887
gap_U 269465 -8.48e-09 4.529502 -15.63197 6.698866
Country tend not to trust tend to trust Total
Austria 55.56 44.44 100.00 
Belgium 42.05 57.95 100.00 
Cyprus 50.22 49.78 100.00 
Finland 50.76 49.24 100.00 
France 56.56 43.44 100.00 
Germany 58.71 41.29 100.00 
Greece 57.41 42.59 100.00 
Ireland 48.06 51.94 100.00 
Italy 52.27 47.73 100.00 
Luxembourg 43.79 56.21 100.00 
Malta 35.26 64.74 100.00 
The Netherlands 47.31 52.69 100.00 
Portugal 49.32 50.68 100.00 
Slovenia 46.97 53.03 100.00 
Spain 52.74 47.26 100.00 
Total 50.88 49.12 100.00 
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Occupation tend not to trust tend to trust Total
Self employed 49.17 50.83 100.00 
managers 42.18 57.82 100.00 
other white collars 48.86 51.14 100.00 
manual workers 54.68 45.32 100.00 
House person 51.84 48.16 100.00 
Unemployed 63.76 36.24 100.00 
Retired 52.79 47.21 100.00 
Student 36.17 63.83 100.00 
Total 50.88 49.12 100.00 
Trust in national government Tend not to trust Tend to trust Total
102822 46850 149672
68.70 % 31.30 %
19726 71588 91314
21.60 % 78.40 %
Total 122548 118438 240986
Tend not to trust 
Tend to trust 
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
 
[1] [2] [3]
ref cat: male                
female 0.940*** 0.938*** 0.928***
(-6.92) (-7.15) (-6.16)   
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 1.198*** 1.198*** 1.226***
(9.08) (9.01) (7.29)   
40-54 0.876*** 0.880*** 0.887***
(-10.97) (-10.60) (-7.12)   
Above 55 0.964* 0.953*** 0.940** 
(-2.54) (-3.31) (-3.13)   
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 1.043* 1.047* 1.066*  
(2.15) (2.33) (2.37)   
Manager 1.355*** 1.355*** 1.384***
(16.14) (16.10) (12.56)   
Manual worker 0.770*** 0.770*** 0.763***
(-16.30) (-16.23) (-12.08)   
House person 0.812*** 0.806*** 0.778***
(-10.53) (-10.84) (-8.73)   
Unemployed 0.583*** 0.614*** 0.615***
(-26.67) (-23.92) (-17.99)   
Retired 0.866*** 0.875*** 0.886***
(-7.83) (-7.20) (-4.79)   
Student 1.391*** 1.398*** 1.353***
(13.04) (13.19) (8.69)   
0.939*** 1.011   
(-7.59) (1.00)   
0.728*** 0.705***
(-31.12) (-18.97)   
Observations 243456 243456 130040
pseudo R-sq 0.055 0.061 0.046   
Log likelihood -159513.2 -158410.3 -83651.9   
chi2 18400.4 20606.3 8122.0   
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Survey dummies Yes Yes Yes
Standardized values of long 
term interest rate
Standardized values of 
unemployment rate
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Trust in national government 9.447*** 9.113*** 9.626*** 9.327*** 9.383***
(205.14) (201.32) (147.09) (146.52) (146.26)   
ref cat: male
female 0.967*** 0.965*** 0.949*** 0.947*** 0.948***
(-3.35) (-3.60) (-3.81) (-3.99) (-3.92)   
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 1.205*** 1.202*** 1.204*** 1.169*** 1.167***
(8.47) (8.34) (5.95) (5.23) (5.15)   
40-54 0.860*** 0.863*** 0.873*** 0.880*** 0.879***
(-11.22) (-10.95) (-7.16) (-6.98) (-7.01)   
Above 55 0.866*** 0.860*** 0.869*** 0.858*** 0.858***
(-8.88) (-9.31) (-6.22) (-6.92) (-6.90)   
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 1.054* 1.058* 1.070* 1.020 1.019   
(2.39) (2.54) (2.22) (0.65) (0.63)   
Manager 1.291*** 1.292*** 1.314*** 1.314*** 1.319***
(12.10) (12.13) (9.29) (9.38) (9.52)   
Manual worker 0.812*** 0.811*** 0.815*** 0.775*** 0.776***
(-11.64) (-11.66) (-8.07) (-10.48) (-10.40)   
House person 0.786*** 0.783*** 0.770*** 0.741*** 0.742***
(-10.86) (-11.02) (-8.04) (-9.96) (-9.92)   
Unemployed 0.675*** 0.705*** 0.711*** 0.648*** 0.647***
(-17.51) (-15.49) (-11.33) (-13.79) (-13.83)   
Retired 0.855*** 0.863*** 0.876*** 0.837*** 0.838***
(-7.54) (-7.11) (-4.63) (-6.28) (-6.22)   
Student 1.374*** 1.381*** 1.366*** 1.395*** 1.406***
(11.36) (11.48) (7.99) (8.65) (8.84)   
survey 0.994*** 0.996*** 0.994*** 0.993***                
(-68.78) (-43.63) (-20.13) (-26.51)                
0.960*** 0.925*** 0.830*** 0.882***
(-5.64) (-7.57) (-13.61) (-8.05)   
0.781*** 0.780*** 1.044* 0.972   
(-25.37) (-12.85) (1.97) (-1.15)   
Observations 240986 240986 127570 127400 127400
Survey dummies No No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized values of 
long term interest rate
Standardized values of 
unemployment rate
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ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE 
 
[1] [2]
ref cat: male
female 0.986*** 0.983***
(-7.02) (-6.09)   
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 1.042*** 1.045***
(8.86) (6.92)   
40-54 0.972*** 0.974***
(-10.28) (-6.92)   
Above 55 0.989** 0.987** 
(-3.20) (-2.94)   
0.992*** 0.987***
(-5.80) (-6.70)   
0.915*** 0.927***
(-46.75) (-20.19)   
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 1.009* 1.013*  
(2.02) (2.15)   
Manager 1.074*** 1.083***
(16.42) (13.21)   
Manual worker 0.941*** 0.940***
(-16.17) (-12.07)   
House person 0.951*** 0.945***
(-10.94) (-8.80)   
Unemployed 0.896*** 0.901***
(-23.76) (-17.53)   
Retired 0.970*** 0.974***
(-7.09) (-4.62)   
Student 1.078*** 1.078***
(12.94) (9.36)   
survey 0.999*** 0.999***
(-49.15) (-17.75)   
Observations 243456 130040
Country dummy Yes Yes
Standardized values of long 
term interest rate
Standardized values of 
unemployment rate
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SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION
 
Trust national EU trust Trust national EU trust
ref cat: male
female 0.984*** 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.983***
(-6.20) (-6.20) (-6.30) (-6.28)
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 1.016** 1.043*** 1.017** 1.043***
(2.71) (6.46) (2.81) (6.56)
40-54 0.995 0.973*** 0.996 0.974***
(-1.44) (-7.09) (-1.21) (-6.90)
Above 55 1.026*** 0.988** 1.026*** 0.988**
(6.13) (-2.74) (6.21) (-2.72)
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 1.003 1.014* 1.002 1.013*
(0.52) (2.23) (0.38) (2.11)
Manager 1.057*** 1.082*** 1.057*** 1.082***
(9.85) (12.98) (9.88) (13.02)
Manual worker 0.950*** 0.939*** 0.951*** 0.939***
(-10.77) (-12.23) (-10.67) (-12.10)
House person 0.978*** 0.943*** 0.979*** 0.944***
(-3.64) (-8.98) (-3.48) (-8.79)
Unemployed 0.912*** 0.897*** 0.915*** 0.901***
(-16.78) (-18.14) (-16.15) (-17.38)
Retired 0.994 0.972*** 0.994 0.973***
(-1.20) (-4.94) (-1.06) (-4.74)
Student 1.026*** 1.077*** 1.026*** 1.077***
(3.41) (9.11) (3.41) (9.13)
survey 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000 0.999***
(-9.42) (-31.13) (1.59) (-18.22)
Long term interest rates 1.001 0.995***
(1.17) (-6.98)
0.986*** 0.985***
(-19.95) (-20.12)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127570 127570 127570 127570
Log likelihood -148029.5 -148029.5 -147667.8 -147667.8
chi2 17416.9 17416.9 17892.2 17892.2
[1] [2]
Domestic unemployment 
rate
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Trust national EU trust Trust national EU trust
ref cat: male
female 0.984*** 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.983***
(-6.19) (-6.25) (-6.29)   (-6.24)   
ref cat: 25-39
15-24 1.016** 1.044*** 1.017** 1.043***
(2.73) (6.63) (2.77)   (6.51)   
40-54 0.995 0.973*** 0.996   0.974***
(-1.46) (-7.19) (-1.20)   (-6.95)   
Above 55 1.026*** 0.987** 1.026*** 0.988** 
(6.09) (-2.92) (6.24)   (-2.73)   
ref cat: Other white collar
Self-employed 1.003 1.015* 1.002   1.013*  
(0.53) (2.38) (0.35)   (2.12)   
Manager 1.057*** 1.082*** 1.057*** 1.082***
(9.85) (12.99) (9.89)   (13.02)   
Manual worker 0.950*** 0.939*** 0.950*** 0.939***
(-10.74) (-12.11) (-10.69)   (-12.13)   
House person 0.979*** 0.944*** 0.979*** 0.944***
(-3.61) (-8.83) (-3.51)   (-8.84)   
Unemployed 0.912*** 0.898*** 0.915*** 0.900***
(-16.69) (-17.85) (-16.16)   (-17.52)   
Retired 0.994 0.972*** 0.994   0.973***
(-1.17) (-4.92) (-1.04)   (-4.74)   
Student 1.026*** 1.076*** 1.026*** 1.077***
(3.40) (9.07) (3.43)   (9.13)   
survey 1.000** 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.998***
(-2.93) (3.45) (-8.21)   (-31.95)   
Long term interest rates 0.997*** 0.993*** 1.000   0.993***
(-4.12) (-9.53) (0.48)   (-8.95)   
0.995* 0.940***                               
(-1.98) (-20.96)                               
1.014*** 1.012***
(19.91)   (15.07)   
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127570 127570 127570 127570
Log likelihood -147689.2 -147689.2 -147722.8   -147722.8   
chi2 17444.2 17444.2 17890.5   17890.5   
[3] [4]
Euro zone unemployment 
rate
Distance from Eurozone 
mean unemployment
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